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Abstract
The green paradox conveys the idea that climate policies may have unin-
tended side effects when taking into account the reaction of fossil fuel suppli-
ers. In particular, carbon taxes that will be implemented in the future induce
resource owners to extract more rapidly which increases present carbon diox-
ide emissions and accelerates global warming. Our results suggest that future
carbon taxes may even decrease present emissions if resource owners face in-
creasing marginal extraction costs and if there is a clean energy source that
is a perfect substitute and exhibits learning-by-doing (LBD).
If the marginal extraction cost curve is sufficiently flat, resource owners
respond to a future carbon tax with lowering total extraction and only slightly
increase present extraction. Moreover, taxation leads to higher energy prices
which induces the renewable energy firms to increase output not only in
the future, but also in the present because of the anticipated benefits from
LBD. This crowds out energy from the combustion of fossil fuels and may
outweigh the initial increase in present extraction, leading to less emissions
in the present.
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1. Introduction
Carbon taxes that effectively combat global warming do not seem to be politically feasible
in the short run as the latest climate conferences in Copenhagen, Cancun and Warsaw
have demonstrated. Therefore, policy makers are restricted to the taxation of carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions in the future. However, the implementation of delayed carbon
taxes leads to the thread of a partial expropriation of resource owners, inducing them to
extract their stocks more rapidly. This reaction is referred to as green paradox because
it causes higher CO2 emissions in the present and accelerates climate change. Moreover,
higher present emissions will cause temperatures to rise faster which leaves less time
for adaptation to global warming. Partly, they may even make adaptation impossible
as some climate change induced effects might take place too rapidly or turn out to be
irreversible. Therefore, with higher levels of contemporary global warming, both climate
change damage and adaptation costs are expected to increase which is why policy makers
should take the green paradox into account when designing climate policies.
This paper shows that, contrary to the green paradox, delayed carbon taxes may
even decrease current emissions if resource owners face increasing marginal extraction
costs and if there is a clean energy source that is a perfect substitute and exhibits
learning-by-doing (LBD). LBD originates e.g. from the routinization of the production
process or from minor technological improvements. It can be thought of as endogenous
technological change which essentially lowers the costs of future production depending
on accumulated production or experience in the past.1 If the marginal extraction cost
curve is sufficiently flat, a delayed carbon tax induces resource owners to reduce the
fossil fuel supply substantially and to shift only very few extraction into the present.
Additionally, taxation yields higher future energy prices which induces the clean energy
sector to expand production not only in the future, but also in the present due to the
1The static correspondent to LBD would be economies of scale. However, under economies of scale, the
cost reduction in unit costs rather originates from the distribution of fixed costs on all units produced
then from a more efficient way of production (as it is the case under LBD) as the output increases.
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anticipated benefits from LBD. The latter reduces the current energy price and induces
resource owners to postpone extraction. If this effect is sufficiently large, it will outweigh
the initial increase in present extraction, leading to less emissions in the present.
Eichner and Pethig (2011) also found that delayed taxation of carbon (in form of a
tighter emissions cap in the future) may even reduce current emissions. However, in
their model the reason for this is the existence of a second country which does not im-
plement any climate policy. Tightening the emissions cap in the future by the abating
country has essentially two effects: First, in the abating country the consumer price for
fossil fuels in the future increases, causing the intertemporally maximizing households
to consume more fossil fuels in the present so that present emissions increase. Second,
the world price for fossil fuels in the future decreases which is why households in the
non-abating country have an incentive to substitute present consumption of fossil fuels
by future consumption, leading to fewer emissions in the present. Under certain con-
ditions concerning the elasticities of fossil fuel demand and intertemporal substitution,
the second effect will outweigh the first one and current emissions will decrease, meaning
that there is a reversal of the green paradox. A similar result is found by Ritter and
Schopf (2014).
The term green paradox was first coined by Sinn (2008a) and relates the theory of
exhaustible resources (Hotelling (1931), Dasgupta and Heal (1979) and Long and Sinn
(1985)) with environmental policies. Starting with Sinclair (1992), the vast majority
of this literature assumes constant or zero extraction costs for exhaustible resources
(Ulph and Ulph (1994), Withagen (1994) and Sinn (2008b)) and the existence of a
clean backstop technology that supplies an unlimited amount of energy, but at a higher
price (Hoel and Kverndokk (1996), Tahvonen (1997), Chakravorty et al. (1997) and
Strand (2007)). In this setting, energy will be supplied exclusively by the combustion
of fossil fuel in the first phase until the resource stock is completely exhausted and the
backstop technology sets in. Moreover, any policy that decreases demand for fossil fuel
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in the future inevitably increases present emissions, leading to higher environmental
harm since total emissions are unaffected.2 However, when extraction costs are convex
(van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012), Hoel and Jensen (2012)), the resource stock may
not be completely exhausted anymore and there is a trade-off between higher present
emissions and lower total emissions. Given this trade-off, Gerlagh (2011) distinguishes
between a weak and a strong green paradox where the net present value of environmental
damage decreases (weak) or increases (strong) in response to a climate policy.
With respect to the supply of renewable energy, assuming increasing rather than
constant marginal costs may be more realistic. One reason for this is that the appro-
priateness of the locations for the installation of renewable energy facilities is decreasing
in the number of facilities already installed. Under this assumption, both the dirty and
the clean energy source are employed simultaneously (Grafton et al. (2012)). Further-
more, the renewable energy sector benefits significantly from LBD.3 According to Arrow
(1962), LBD establishes a negative relationship between future production costs and
past accumulated production.4
One strand of the literature includes both the extraction decision of fossil fuel owners
and LBD in the alternative energy sector in its models but does not focus on the green
paradox (Tahvonen and Salo (2001), Chakravorty et al. (2012), Kalkuhl and Edenhofer
(2012, 2013)). Closest to our paper is Chakravorty et al. (2011) who find that the pres-
ence of learning in the renewable energy sector reduces energy prices and may accelerate
resource extraction. Our approach differs from their approach with respect to several
dimensions: Firstly, concerning the taxation of carbon emissions, Chakravorty et al.
2However, Edenhofer and Kalkuhl (2011) show that also overall emissions may decrease if carbon taxes
are set sufficiently high. In this case, fossil fuel owners will only it may not anymore be optimal for
the resource owners to exhaust their stocks completely because the market price for fossil fuel may
be lower than the carbon tax.
3Empirically, Duke and Kammen (1999) and McDonald and Schrattenholzer (2001) report lower pro-
duction costs with increasing production for solar panels and wind energy. For example, McDonald
and Schrattenholzer (2001) report learning rates for wind and solar energy to be between 5 and 35
%, meaning a cost reduction of 5 to 35 % when the cumulative production is doubled.
4With respect to renewable energy, this assumption was incorporated in the models of Fischer and
Newell (2008) and Kverndokk and Rosendahl (2007).
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(2011) focus rather on the impact on energy prices and tax incidence than on the green
paradox. Secondly, their analysis does not consider the case of increasing marginal ex-
traction costs which is why the resource stock is always exhausted in their framework.
Thirdly, they do not analyze any policies that aim to promote renewable energy. Lastly
and most importantly, they use a dynamic setting with more than two periods which
can be solved only numerically via calibration. Even though the authors conduct an
extensive sensitivity analysis, their conclusions remain subject to the choice of the pa-
rameter values. We take a different approach by focusing on a two period model which
allows us to derive theoretical results without relying on numerical solutions.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the green paradox by analyzing climate
policies in the presence of LBD in the renewable energy sector and optimal extraction
of non-renewable resources. More precisely, we analyze subsidies for renewable energy
as well as carbon taxes and derive conditions under which the green paradox arises.
As a reference, we assume extraction costs to be zero which always leads to full ex-
haustion of the resource stock, implying the change in environmental damage to depend
only on the change in current emissions. First, we examine the effect of LBD on the
extraction decision and show that in the absence of any climate policy the effect of more
effective learning on current emissions is ambiguous. The reason for this is that on the
one hand learning reduces the future production costs leading to higher renewable energy
output in the future. This causes the future energy price to decline and induces resource
owners to extract more rapidly. On the other hand, learning also tends to increase
the current renewable energy output due to the anticipation of the benefits from LBD.
This decreases the current energy price and incentivizes resource owners to postpone
extraction. The overall effect of learning on current emissions is therefore ambiguous.
Second and with respect to climate policies, we find that (still assuming zero extrac-
tion costs) the implementation of present (future) carbon taxes decreases (increases)
current emissions which is the standard result of the green paradox. Further, subsi-
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dizing renewable energy may increase current emissions depending on the magnitude
of the learning factor. A subsidy for present output of renewable energy rises energy
production and lowers the present energy price, inducing resource owners to postpone
extraction. However, this effect is counteracted by the indirect effect due to LBD ac-
cording to which future production costs decrease as more experience is accumulated in
the present. This leads to more renewable energy production and lower energy prices in
the future and incentivizes resource owners to extract more rapidly. If the learning effect
is sufficiently large, this indirect effect dominates the initial effect and present emissions
increase. Therefore, also subsidizing renewable energy may cause the green paradox.
In the more general model, we allow for increasing marginal extraction costs and get
a result that is in contrast to the green paradox, namely that delayed taxation of carbon
may even decrease current emissions. If marginal extraction costs are increasing, resource
owners will not exhaust the full stock of resources entirely and any climate policy does
not only affect the timing of the extraction, but also the volume of total extraction. In
response to a future carbon tax, resource owners initially shift some extraction to the
present and reduce overall extraction where both result in higher future energy prices.
This induces the renewable energy sector to expand production in the future and - due
to the anticipated gains from LBD - also in the present. The latter leads to falling
energy prices in the present and incentivizes resource owners to postpone extraction. If
the marginal extraction cost curve is sufficiently flat, the impact of taxation on future
energy prices and therefore on the renewable energy sector is substantial. In this case,
the incentive for resource owners to postpone extraction outweighs the initial increase
of current emissions and current emissions decrease despite the fact that a carbon tax
in the future was implemented. Thus, there is a reversal of the green paradox.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model with zero ex-
traction costs while Section 3 analyzes the effect of LBD on present emissions in the
absence of climate policies. In Section 4, we examine the impact of climate policies on
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environmental damage. Section 5 extends the basic model by assuming convex extrac-
tion costs and analyzes the effect of LBD and climate policies on both present and total
emissions. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Basic Model
The model consists of two time periods where the first period may represent the next
5 to 10 years, the time necessary to accumulate experience, whereas the second period
represents the remaining future. In the following, lower-case letters always refer to
variables and functions in the first and capital letters to variables and functions in the
second period. There are two sources of energy: A polluting energy source from fossil
fuels (x) and a clean renewable energy source (y) which exhibits LBD.
2.1. Fossil Fuel Sector and Environmental Damage
Energy is produced by the combustion of fossil fuels. We normalize units such that one
unit of fossil fuel is converted into one unit of energy, causing one unit of emissions. The
market for fossil fuels is competitive. To begin with, we assume resource owners to have
zero extraction costs which serves as a reference case for the analysis. This assumption
will be relaxed in Section 5 where we assume extraction costs to be convex. With zero
extraction costs, it is always optimal to exhaust the stock of resources X¯ completely as
long as the energy price is still positive.




pif = (p− t)x+ β(P − T )X s.t. x+X ≤ X¯ (1)
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where t and T are per unit carbon taxes and β denotes the discount factor.5 The first-
order condition (FOC) yields the arbitrage condition according to Hotelling’s rule in a
two-period framework
p− t = β(P − T ). (2)
The FOC states that in an interior solution the producer price in the present period
equals the discounted future producer price, implying the resource owner to be indifferent
between extracting today or in the future.
Let X˜ = x+X be the total amount of emissions, the environmental damage function
can be represented as
ED = ED(x, X˜) (3)
with EDx > 0 and EDX˜ > 0.
6 Thus, the damage from global warming increases in
both present and total emissions.7 Since the resource stock is exhausted completely, we
have X˜ = X¯ and the change of environmental damage only depends on the variation of
current emissions.
2.2. Renewable Energy Sector
Renewable energy is produced in a competitive market where the representative firm
faces increasing marginal costs in both periods, i.e. cy(y) > 0, cyy(y) > 0, CY (y, Y ) > 0
and CY Y (y, Y ) > 0. This reflects the fact that for each firm, the marginal productivity
tends to decrease as the output of renewable energy facilities is expanded. Moreover,
on sector level, the appropriateness of locations for the installation of renewable energy
facilities tends to decrease once the most appropriate locations have already been used.
Consider the example of onshore wind farms. While the first wind farm is constructed
5For convenience, we abstract from discounting within each period since it would not add any important
insight.
6In the following, subscripts denote the first or second derivative with respect to the corresponding
variable.
7Climate damage can be expected to rise in current emissions even in the absence of discounting as it
may accelerate climate change. For a more elaborated discussion see Hoel (2011).
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in the area where the wind blows strongest and most steadily, any further wind farm
will have less favorable conditions.8 Furthermore, some raw materials such as rare earth
metals that are crucial in the production of renewable energy facilities may become
increasingly scarce and expensive as the capacity of renewable energy expands, causing
marginal costs to increase.
We incorporate LBD by assuming future costs to decline with experience accumulated
in the first period, but at a decreasing rate, i.e. Cy(y, Y ) < 0 and Cyy(y, Y ) > 0 as
well as CyY (y, Y ) = CY y(y, Y ) < 0.
9 The latter states that also future marginal costs
decrease with experience. Furthermore, we assume overall convexity of the cost function,
implying CyyCY Y −C2yY > 0 in order to satisfy second order conditions. This condition
basically states that the own convexity dominates the cross effects.10 A typical functional
form that incorporates increasing unit costs compared to the learning curve proposed
by Wright (1936) can be represented by11
C(y, Y, b) = C(Y )y−b (4)
with y > 1, C(Y ) a convex function and b > 0 representing the learning factor that
determines the magnitude of the cost reduction due to accumulated experience in the first
period.12 We assume that a higher learning factor decreases future marginal costs and
strengthens the effect of accumulated experience on future costs, i.e. CY b < 0, Cyb < 0
8According to this argument, the convexity of the cost function in the second period should also depend
on the amount of renewable energy produced in the first period. However, we abstract from those
intertemporal relationships. One can think of all renewable energy facilities constructed in the first
period being fully depreciated at the beginning of the second period and having to be replaced by
new facilities.
9In reality, also the fossil fuel sector is likely to exhibit some LBD. However, since this sector is relatively
mature, the learning rates in the renewable energy sector should be far higher. We incorporate this
fact by normalizing the learning rate in the fossil fuel sector to zero and assuming learning to take
place exclusively in the renewable energy sector.
10The same assumption is found in Reichenbach and Requate (2012) and Lehmann (2013).
11Wright (1936) proposed a learning curve with constant unit costs, i.e. C(y, Y, b) = cY y−b.
12The interpretation of the learning factor b is the following: The unit costs fall by b whenever accumu-
lated production is doubled.
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and CyY b < 0.
13 The relationship between future costs and first-period quantities is




y1 < y2 < y3
Figure 1: Cost Function of Renewable Energy with LBD
The representative firm takes the positive effect of LBD into account and maximizes
its profit
pir = (p+ s)y − c(y) + β[PY − C(y, Y, b)] (5)
where s is the per unit subsidy.14 Differentiating with respect to y and Y yields the
following FOCs for an interior solution15
∂pir
∂y
= 0 ⇔ p+ s = cy(y) + βCy(y, Y, b) (6)
∂pir
∂Y
= 0 ⇔ P = CY (y, Y, b). (7)
13Note that for the functional form of equation (4), the term CY b is always negative while Cyb =
C(Y )y−b−1[b ln y − 1] is only negative for b < 1/ ln y which means that b may not be too large. The
latter also holds true for CyY b.
14Note that we only consider a subsidy in the first period since we assume that the government would
like to take advantage of LBD by triggering first period output.
15For an interior solution, we require cy(0) < p + s and CY (0) < P which guarantees y and Y to be
strictly positive quantities.
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Equation (6) implies that the firm chooses the first period quantity such that the
marginal costs exceed the producer price since βCy(y, Y, b) is negative. The firm antici-
pates the future cost reduction when determining the present quantity and is therefore
willing to accept a potential loss in the first period. Note that we implicitly assume that
all learning is private and that there are no learning spillovers. However, introducing
learning spillovers would not alter any of our qualitative results as long as LBD is at
least partially private.16 This issue will be discussed further at the end of Section 5.
2.3. Equilibrium
The demand for energy is falling in price. Since both energy sources are assumed to
be perfect substitutes, the energy price is given by the inverse demand p(x + y) with
px = py = p
′ < 0 and P (X + Y ) with PX = PY = P ′ < 0. Incorporating the inverse
demand into the FOCs of the fossil fuel (equation (2)) and renewable energy sector
(equations (6) and (7)) constitutes a system of three equations with three endogenous
variables x, y and Y that depend on the resource stock X¯, the learning factor b and
the policy variables s, t and T .17 We assume all agents to have perfect information
and the government to be able to fully commit to its announced policies. Since there
is no uncertainty, all outcomes in this deterministic setting are already certain at the
beginning of the first period. Thus, in the following we apply comparative statics in
order to analyze how the outcomes represented by the three endogenous variables x, y
and Y alter in response to a change of the learning factor b or the climate policies s, t
and T .
16Introducing learning spillovers would cause the gains from learning to be appropriated only partially
by a single firm. However, each firm would still have an incentive to produce y in excess (such
that marginal costs exceed the producer price) due to the anticipation of future cost reductions.
Formally, equation (6) would change to p+ s = cy(y) + ρβCy(y, Y, b) where ρ is the degree of private
appropriability. See Fischer and Newell (2007) for a formal derivation of the appropriability rate.
17In fact, also the second period extraction X is an endogenous variable. However, since resource
owners always exhaust their (exogenously given) stocks completely, second period extraction is only
the residual between the total stock and present extraction and therefore immediately given when x
is determined.
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3. The Effect of Learning on Fossil Fuel Extraction
Before turning to the effect of climate policies on the extraction decision of fossil fuel
owners, we should examine how the pure presence of LBD in the renewable energy sector
affects the extraction decision. Since we are interested in the effect of LBD, represented
by the learning factor b, we set the policy variables s, t and T equal to zero. An increase
in the learning factor results in two initial effects which augment the amount of both
present and future renewable energy output y and Y . However, both initial effects have
different impact on first period extraction x.
The first initial effect of a higher learning factor b results in an expansion of future
renewable energy output Y since it decreases future production costs. This affects the
first period extraction x via two channels. First, the second period energy price decreases
which induces resource owners to shift extraction to the present. Second, the renewable
energy firms also increase y because the benefits from LBD are increasing with higher
output of Y .18 This reduces the first period energy price and causes resource owners to
postpone extraction. Thus, there are two countervailing effects which is why the total
effect of an initial increase in Y on x is ambiguous.
The second initial effect of a higher learning factor increases y because learning has
become more effective and firms are therefore willing to invest more in future cost reduc-
tion via augmenting y. However, the effect of an increase of y on x works again via two
channels. First, the first period energy price declines and resource owners will postpone
extraction. The second channel originates from LBD where the renewable energy firms
increase Y due to lower production costs. This reduces P and induces resource owners
to extract more rapidly. Since both channels work in opposing directions, the effect of
an initial increase in y on x is also ambiguous.
In total, the overall effect of an increasing learning factor on current emissions is
unclear. Formally, we have a system of three equations originating from the three FOCs
18Formally, we have dy
dY
=
β(CY Y −CyY )
cyy+β(Cyy−CyY ) > 0.
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(equations (2), (6) and (7)) with the three endogenous variables x, y and Y and the
exogenous variable b. We totally differentiate this system and get19

p′ + βP ′ p′ −βP ′
p′ p′ − cyy(y)− βCyy(y, Y, b) −βCyY (y, Y, b)












CY b(y, Y, b)db

(8)








{βCyb[βP ′CyY −p′(P ′−CY Y )]}+{CY b[βP ′(p′−cyy−βCyy)−βp′CyY ]}
]
(9)
where det(M) is the determinant of matrix M . We show in the appendix that the sign of
det(M) is negative given our assumptions concerning the cost function. The first term
in curly brackets represents the effect of an increase in b on x which originates from
a change in y whereas the second term displays the effect originating from the initial
increase of Y . As can be seen, the sign of both effects is ambiguous which is why the
effect of an increase in the learning factor on current emissions is ambiguous as well.
In the appendix, we show that also the overall effect of an increase of the learning
factor on the renewable energy quantities y and Y is not clear even though the initial
effects are positive. The reason for this is that each initial effect can be outweighed by
the indirect consequences of the other effect. However, a higher learning factor always
increases the total quantity of energy produced in each period. Therefore, the energy
price unambiguously declines with higher b. Both results are in line with Chakravorty
et al. (2011). Finally, Proposition 1 summarizes the findings





20In the following, we suppress the arguments of the functions for the sake of notational convenience.
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Proposition 1
The overall effect of an increase in b on the energy quantities x, y and Y is ambiguous.
However, total energy production in both periods rises with b, causing the energy price
to decline.
4. The Effect of Climate Policies
We now turn to the comparative statics of the effects of the policy variables t, T and s
on the endogenous variables x, y and Y . Analogously to the analysis above, we totally
differentiate the FOCs (2), (6) and (7) holding the learning factor b > 0 constant and












where M is the matrix that was defined in the previous section.
The Effect of Taxation
First, we start with the implementation of a future tax T in order to reassess the
standard result of the green paradox which predicts present emissions to increase. The










As the determinant of M is negative and the numerator N is unambiguously positive,
future taxation always increases present fossil fuel extraction and the green paradox
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arises.21 However, LBD attenuates the magnitude of the shift of extraction to the
present. A reduction in second period extraction increases second period energy price
which induces renewable energy firms to expand production in the future and - due
to the anticipated gains from LBD - also in the present. The latter lowers the energy
price in the present, incentivizing resource owners to postpone extraction. However,
the reduction in present extraction can never outweigh the initial increase in present
extraction as long as the stock of resources will be exhausted entirely. We will see in
Section 5 that present extraction does not necessarily increase in response to delayed
carbon taxation when resource owners will not exhaust the entire resource stock but
only those resources which are economically viable.
Concerning the introduction of a present carbon tax t, it will definitely induce resource
owners to postpone extraction - though the magnitude of the extraction shift is again
attenuated by the presence of LBD. If both taxes were introduced simultaneously, the
reaction of the resource owners would depend on the tax path. More precisely, current
extraction will increase (decrease) as long as the future tax increases with a rate higher
(lower) than the interest rate. This is the standard result of the green paradox.
The effect of taxation on the renewable energy quantities y and Y is ambiguous. For
example, a delayed carbon tax induces resource owners to shift extraction to the present
which lowers p. This leads to less current and - because of LBD - also to less future
renewable energy output. At the same time, the tax increases the future energy price
which causes y and Y to increase. The overall effect finally depends on the magnitude
of the learning factor.
The Effect of Subsidizing Renewable Energy
21Even though −βC2yY is negative, the numerator is unambiguously positive due to the assumption that
own convexity dominates cross effects.
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We next analyze the effect of a subsidy for present renewable energy on present ex-
traction.22 Proceeding analogously as above, we find that a subsidy always increases





[βP ′CyY − p′(P ′ − CY Y )] (12)
where the sign of the equation is ambiguous and depends, in particular, on the size of
the term CyY that represents LBD. For small absolute values of CyY , a subsidy yields
less x whereas higher values of CyY will increase x. The magnitude of CyY depends
positively on the size of the learning factor b. To see this, consider the linear cost
function C(y, Y, b) = (a− by)Y . In this case, we have CyY = −b, implying the absolute
value of CyY to be increasing in b. For the functional form from equation (4), the
absolute value of CyY increases in b as long as b is not too large.
23
Turning to the interpretation of the result, we distinguish between the direct effect
and the indirect effect due to LBD which is shown in Figure 2. Given that a renewable
energy subsidy increases present output, the direct effect causes p to decline and induces
resource owners to postpone extraction (x decreases).
The indirect effect works in the opposite direction: An increase in y leads to lower
future renewable energy costs which induces renewable energy firms to expand the pro-
duction of Y . This causes the future energy price to fall and incentivizes resource owners
to extract more rapidly (x increases). Whether or not the indirect effect outweighs the
direct effect with respect to present extraction depends on the size of the term CyY and
therefore on the learning factor b. Figure 3 shows the change in the energy quantities in
22In practice, many governments encourage renewable energy production making use of feed-in tariffs.
According to REN (2013) p. 68, feed-in tariffs are the most widely adopted policy instrument to
support renewable energy employed by 71 countries in 2013. However, the qualitative result of our
analysis would not change since both subsidies and feed-in tariffs lead to an increase of the producer
price relative to the no-policy scenario.
23To see this, note that CyY b = CY (Y )y
−b−1(b ln y − 1) which is negative for small b and becomes
















Figure 2: Effect of Subsidizing Renewable Energy on Current Extraction
response to an introduction of a subsidy for different learning factors b.24
In the absence of learning (b = 0), we only observe the direct effect of the subsidy
which increases y and reduces x and Y . The reduction of Y results from the fact that
resource owners postpone extraction which reduces the future energy price and therefore
also Y .
The indirect effect works diametrically to the direct effect. Thus, as learning sets in,
dy declines in response to a decrease of Y while dY rises due to the cost reduction that
was caused by higher present renewable output. Figure 3 indicates that, as b becomes
larger, dY turns positive which also reinforces the output of y (due to the anticipation of
cost benefits). More importantly, higher future renewable output reduces future energy
prices, inducing fossil fuel owners to extract more rapidly. For b being large enough, the
indirect effect dominates the direct effect with respect to x, leading to higher present
extraction in response to a subsidy for renewable energy. Thus, despite the fact that the
substitute of present energy from fossil fuel was subsidized, present extraction increases
and the green paradox arises.
24See appendix for the used functional forms and parameter values.
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Figure 3: Effect of Subsidizing Renewable Energy on Energy Quantities
Proposition 2 summarizes the insights from this section.
Proposition 2
Let extraction costs be zero. Then
a) present emissions increase (decrease) if the carbon tax rises faster (slower) than
the interest rate while LBD attenuates the magnitude of the change in emissions.
b) a present renewable energy subsidy increases present emissions if the learning factor
is sufficiently high.
5. General Model with Increasing Marginal Extraction Costs
So far, we assumed resource owners to have zero extraction costs. If fossil fuel suppliers
faced positive, but constant marginal extraction costs, the analysis from Section 3 and
4 would still be valid as long as the energy price exceeds the marginal extraction costs.
Under this assumption, it would still be optimal to exhaust the available resource stock
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completely.25 However, if resource owners face increasing marginal extraction costs,
they are likely not to exhaust all of their physically available resources, but only those
resources which are economically viable. In this case, any climate policy does not only
affect the timing of extraction, but also the total volume of extraction. In fact, there is
much evidence that the marginal extraction costs are increasing with the quantity that
has already been extracted.26 First, for each oil well or coal mine, extraction of the first
units requires less energy than extraction of any further unit. Second and on a global
level, once the lowest cost resources have already been exhausted, higher cost resources
have to be extracted. For example, oil is increasingly exploited from deep water wells or
energy intensive tar sands which exhibit far higher extraction costs than conventional
oil wells.
For our analysis, let z be the accumulated extraction amount and e(z) be the extraction
cost function. For simplicity, we assume e(z) to be zero up to a threshold x′ with
x < x′ < x + X and e(z) to be positive and rising beyond that threshold. Thus, in
the first period extraction costs are always zero whereas they are convex in the second
period. This assumption does not affect any of our qualitative results but simplifies the
analysis. Then, the maximization problem of the representative resource owner reads
max
x,X
pif ′ = (p− t)x+ β[(P − T )X − e(x+X)] s.t. x+X ≤ X¯. (13)
If the resource constraint is not binding, the FOCs are given by
∂pif ′
∂x
= 0 ⇔ p− t = β(P − T ) (14)
∂pif ′
∂X
= 0 ⇔ P − T = eX˜(X˜) (15)
25However, if marginal extraction costs were sufficiently high, resource owners would only extract the
amount until the producer price equals the marginal costs. In this case, resource owners will only
extract a part of the physically available resources. This issue will be discussed more extensively at
the end of this section.
26See Rogner (1997) for estimates of the marginal extraction cost curves for different hydrocarbon
resources.
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where eX˜(X˜) = ex(X˜) = eX(X˜) are the marginal extraction costs evaluated at X˜ and
X˜ = x+X is the total extraction amount. In the following, our analysis is based on the
assumption that the resource stock is exhausted economically rather than physically,
implying X˜ < X¯.27 In fact, this assumption will be crucial for most of our further
results and will be discussed more extensively at the end of this section. Equation
(14) represents Hotelling’s rule and corresponds perfectly with equation (2) due to the
assumption concerning the extraction costs in the first period.28 Equation (15) pins
down the total extraction X˜ and states that in equilibrium the producer price defined as
market price for energy minus per unit carbon tax must equal the marginal extraction
costs. If the producer price was above the marginal extraction costs, resource owners
could increase their profits by extracting more. If the producer price was below the
marginal extraction costs, resource owners would benefit from reducing extraction. Since
X˜ is endogenous, we have to consider both present and total emissions in order to assess
the effect of learning and the climate policies on environmental damage.
In order to reduce the system of four equations (equations (6), (7), (14) and (15)) and
four endogenous variables (x, y, Y and X˜) to three, we totally differentiate equation
(15) taking into account the inverse demand function P = P (X + Y ) as well as the fact
that dX = dX˜ − dx and get
dX˜ =
P ′
P ′ − eX˜X˜(X˜)
(dx− dY ) + 1
P ′ − eX˜X˜(X˜)
dT. (16)
This equation is plugged in when we totally differentiate the remaining three FOCs
yielding a system of three equations with three endogenous variables (x, y and Y ).29
27If the resource constraint was binding and the resource stock was exhausted physically, we would have
e(x+X) = e(X¯) which is constant. Then, the FOCs (14) and (15) reduce to p− t = β(P − T ) and
we would be back in the setting of Sections 3 and 4.
28If extraction costs in the first period were positive as well, Hotelling’s rule would read p− t− ex(x) =
β(P − T − ex(x)). However, this would not alter any of our qualitative results.
29In the appendix, we derive equation (16) in more detail.
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5.1. The Effect of Learning
As before, we begin our analysis with examining the effect of an increase of the learning
factor b on the environmental damage. Setting the policy variables s, t and T equal to
zero, totally differentiating equations (6), (7) and (14) and substituting equation (16)
where necessary yields

p′ + αβP ′ p′ −αβP ′
p′ p′ − cyy(y)− βCyy(y, Y, b) −βCyY (y, Y, b)












CY b(y, Y, b)db

(17)





∈ [0, 1). Given that second
period energy demand is price sensitive (P ′ < 0), the factor α essentially measures the
steepness of the marginal extraction cost curve, which is equivalent to the supply curve
of fossil fuels, evaluated at X˜.
The effect of an increase of b on the energy quantities x, y and Y is again ambiguous












′(p′ − cyy − βCyy)− βp′CyY ]
where the upper line represents the initial effect of a higher learning factor on y and the
lower line the initial effect on Y . Relative to the case without extraction costs, equation
(18) differs from equation (9) only with respect to the factor α. If α was 1, there would
be no difference in the effect of a higher learning factor on x. However, if α was close to
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zero, a higher learning factor would unambiguously reduce current emissions.30
From the last section, we have seen that a higher learning factor initially increases
both renewable energy quantities y and Y . As a first effect, a higher y decreases p and
leads resource owners to postpone extraction regardless of the size of α. However, this
effect is counteracted by the second effect according to which a higher b increases Y and
lowers P . A fall in P affects both the Hotelling rule according to equation (14) and the
total extraction amount according to equation (15) where both induce resource owners
to reduce second period supply X. The amount X can be reduced via both increasing
present extraction and reducing total extraction. Formally, we have x + X = X˜ which
implies that dX = dX˜ − dx. The magnitude of dX˜ and dx finally depends on α.
Consider first the case where α → 1, implying that either eX˜X˜(X˜) goes to infinity
or P ′ → 0. In the following we will not focus on the latter case since this would imply
demand for energy to be almost completely inelastic.31 For eX˜X˜(X˜) going to infinity, we
are essentially in the setting of the model from Section 3 because the fossil fuel supply
curve evaluated at X˜ is completely inelastic (a vertical line) and so the resource owners
will almost always extract the same amount X˜ regardless of the price P . Consequently,
resource owners hardly ever reduce total extraction (dX˜ → 0) and will increase present
extraction until Hotelling’s rule is satisfied (dX → −dx). As α becomes smaller, resource
owners would more and more reduce X via lowering X˜. This partially offsets the initial
fall in P , so that the incentive to increase present extraction becomes smaller. For
α → 0, we have dX → dX˜ which implies dx → 0. In this case, the effect of an
initially increased Y on x becomes negligible while an initially increase in y still lowers
x which is why a higher learning factor unambiguously reduces current emissions. In
the appendix, we show that there is at most one cut-off value for α for which the term
dx
db potentially switches its sign. For any values of α below the cut-off value, current
30We show in the appendix that also the renewable energy quantities y and Y unambiguously increase
for α being sufficiently small.
31If demand for energy was completely inelastic, an increase in Y would not have any impact on x, y or
X˜ because P is not affected.
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emissions unambiguously decrease in response to a higher learning factor. For values of
α above the threshold, the effect of more effective learning on current emissions may be
positive or negative.
We next turn to the question of how the total extraction and therefore total emissions
are affected by more effective learning. We derive expressions for dxdb and
dY
db from







′CY Y −p′CyY ]+CY b[−p′βCyY +p′(cyy+βCyy)]
]
< 0. (19)
For any α ∈ [0, 1), the total amount of extraction is decreasing in the learning factor






∈ [0, 1) be a measurement of the steepness of the marginal ex-
traction cost curve evaluated at X˜. If extraction costs are convex and the resource stock
is exhausted economically, an increase of the learning factor impacts present and total
emissions and therefore environmental damage depending on α according to the following
table:
Table 1: Effect of a higher
Learning Factor
α large α small
x -/+ -
X˜ - -
ED(x, X˜) -/+ -
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As learning becomes more effective, total emissions always decline regardless of the size
of α. If α is sufficiently large, the impact of a higher learning factor on present emissions
is still ambiguous. If present emissions decrease as well, there will be unambiguously
less environmental damage. If present emissions increase, the effect on environmental
damage is unclear since there is a trade off between higher present and fewer total
emissions. In this case, the change of environmental damage depends on the specific
functional form of ED(x, X˜) as well as on the magnitude of the changes in x and X˜.
For α sufficiently small, both present and total emissions unambiguously decline and the
effect on total damage is negative.
5.2. The Effect of Climate Policies
We now turn to the analysis of the policy instruments. Therefore, we proceed analogously












Note that a future carbon tax also affects directly the decision of the second period
output of renewable energy in form of the last entry of the vector on the right-hand side
compared to equation (8) from Section 4.32
Concerning the effect of the policies s, t and T on total emissions X˜, we show in
the appendix that all three policies reduce total extraction as long as α < 1. Since all
climate policies reduce the producer price for fossil fuels in the future, resource owners
will lower total extraction.
We next examine the effect of the policy variables on the energy quantities x, y and Y .
Concerning an introduction of t and s, our results from Section 4 do not alter. In fact, a
32The reason for this is that a future carbon tax influences not only Hotelling’s rule, meaning the decision
between extracting today or in the future, but also the total amount of emissions which causes X to
be endogenous and not only to be the residual between the resource stock and present extraction.
Since X is endogenous and depends on T , also P and therefore Y are directly affected by T .
24
present carbon tax always reduces present fossil fuel extraction while the effect on output
of renewable energy in both periods is ambiguous and depends on the magnitude of the
learning effect.33 With the introduction of a subsidy for renewable energy, the quantity
y increases unambiguously while the effect on x and Y depends on the magnitude of the
learning effect. However, for α close to zero, we definitely observe a decline in x and a
rise in Y .34 The results are summarized in Proposition 4 below.
Turning to the introduction of a future tax, the effect of T on y and Y is still ambiguous
as in the reference case with zero extraction costs. However, the effect of T on present






(−αβ)[(p′ − cyy − βCyy)(αP ′ − CY Y )− βC2yY ]+ (21)
1
det(M ′)
(α− 1)[−βp′CyY + αβP ′(p′ − cyy − βCyy)].
For α→ 1, the lower term virtually vanishes and we observe x to increase with T which
is the standard result of the green paradox. On the other hand, as α approaches zero,
the effect of an increase in T on x becomes negative. In the appendix, we show that
dx
dT monotonically increases with α which guarantees the existence of a cut-off value for
α where dxdT > 0 if α exceeds this value. For α being below this cut-off value, we have
dx
dT < 0 which is contradictory to the green paradox.
The reason for this result is the following: An introduction of T has essentially two
effects. First, second period producer price P − T initially decreases which induces
resource owners to reduce X via increasing present extraction and reducing total ex-
33However, if α is close to zero, both renewable energy quantities unambiguously increase. The reason
is that a present carbon tax only affects p while P is hardly affected because resource owners reduce
present extraction via lowering X˜ rather than postponing extraction. Thus, the effect of an increase
in t initially leads to a rise in y, but not to a fall in Y as it was the case with zero extraction costs.
Moreover, higher y causes higher output of Y due to the effect of LBD which is why both energy
quantities increase.
34The reason is that as y increases in response to a subsidy, resource owners will lower x via reducing
X˜, letting P and therefore Y virtually unaffected. Nevertheless, Y increases due to the LBD effect.
This causes P to decrease, but again resource owners will rather reduce X˜ than increase x so that
the overall effect of a renewable energy subsidy is a decline in x and a rise in Y .
25
traction. Second, as X decreases, second period energy price P increases which leads
to higher output of Y and induces the renewable energy firm to produce more y due to
the anticipation of the gains from LBD. This decreases p and crowds out current energy
from fossil fuels as it induces resource owners to reduce first period extraction. For α
sufficiently small, this reduction outweighs the initial increase in first period extraction










Figure 4: Delayed Carbon Taxation with Flat Marginal Extraction Cost Curve
In the absence of taxation, we find the equilibrium where, according to equation (15),
the marginal extraction cost curve intersects the second period energy demand curve
(XOld and POld). Taxation leads to an upward shift of the marginal extraction cost
curve. The new equilibrium is characterized by the second period fossil fuel quantity
XNew. More importantly, observe that the difference between new and old energy price
PNew−POld is relatively large which means that renewable energy firms will expand their
production substantially. Moreover, the difference between old and new producer price
POld− (PNew−T ) is very small so that resource owners have only very few incentives to
increase present extraction according to Hotelling’s rule. Thus, as α is sufficiently small,
it is likely that the crowding out of first period extraction by the expansion of renewable
energy production outweighs the initial increase in present extraction. Consequently,
26
present extraction decreases despite the fact that a future tax is introduced. A result
that is in stark contrast to the standard result of the green paradox. Finally, Proposition





∈ [0, 1) be a measurement of the steepness of the marginal extrac-
tion cost curve evaluated at X˜. If extraction costs are convex and the resource stock is
exhausted economically, then the effect of climate policies on present and total emissions
depends on α according to the following table:
Table 2: Effect of Climate Policies
Variable Effect of t Effect of T Effect of s
α large α small α large α small α large α small
x - - + - -/+ -
X˜ - - - - - -
ED(x, X˜) - - -/+ - -/+ -
The introduction of a present carbon tax unambiguously decreases environmental
damage regardless of the size of α. If α is large, the effect of a subsidy on present emis-
sions depends on the size of the learning factor as in Section 4 while future carbon taxes
tend to increase present emissions. Then, according to Gerlagh (2011), we can either
observe a weak green paradox where the effect on environmental damage is negative
or a strong green paradox, where the increased damage from higher present emissions
outweighs the decreased damage from lower total emissions. If α is small, a subsidy
and also a future carbon tax reduce present as well as total emissions and therefore the
environmental damage. The main result of this paper is that present emissions may
decrease in response to delayed carbon taxation which is a reversal of the green paradox.
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For this result to hold, three conditions have to be satisfied: First, learning should be
private to the extent that renewable energy firms, at least partially, anticipate future cost
reduction due to LBD when choosing present quantity which leads to crowding out of
present energy from fossil fuel. Second, the marginal extraction cost curve evaluated at
X˜ should be very flat so that resource owners only slightly increase present extraction.
Third, the resource stock needs to be exhausted economically rather than physically
which causes the total extraction amount to decline in response to any climate policy
including delayed carbon taxation.
With respect to learning, our analysis assumed that all gains from learning are private
and are therefore perfectly internalized by the representative firm. In reality, LBD is
likely to be influenced by both own accumulated experience (internal learning) and
total experience of the whole sector (external learning). Then, firms will produce an
inefficiently low amount of output because they do not internalize the positive externality
in form of learning spillovers on their competitors.35 The empirical literature on learning
demonstrates the existence of learning spillovers, but emphasizes that internal learning
is the predominant source of learning.36 Thus, the benefits from LBD will be at least
partially internalized by the renewable energy firms and the first condition that drives
our result is satisfied.
Concerning the marginal extraction cost curve, there are surprisingly only few studies
that deal with the estimation of long run supply curves for fossil fuels. Since oil is rela-
tively unimportant in the production of electricity, we restrict our attention to natural
gas and coal. We evaluate the slope of the marginal extraction cost curve at the market
price of the resource that is likely to prevail in the future. Given equation (15), this is
equivalent to evaluating the supply curve at X˜. For natural gas, Bauer et al. (2013) es-
timate the market price to be around 6 USD per GJ energy by 2050.37 They distinguish
35In fact, this would be an economic justification for subsidizing renewable energy.
36See Irwin and Klenow (1994), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and Gruber (1998).
37In the following, USD always refers to real United States Dollar per GJ energy in the year 2005.
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the estimated supply curves between low, medium and high resource availability. While
in the low resource availability scenario the supply curve becomes steep beyond 5 USD,
the supply curves are still flat around 6 USD in the other two scenarios.38 Further, the
supply curve estimated by Rogner (1997) only becomes steep beyond a price of around
10 USD. For coal, the market price is expected to be around 3 USD by 2050. At this
price, the three estimated supply curves of Bauer et al. (2013) as well as the supply
curve of Rogner (1997) are still flat. Thus, even though all those estimates are subject
to enormous uncertainty, there is at least some evidence that the marginal extraction
cost curve is flat at the prevailing future market price which indicates that also the
second condition is likely to be satisfied.
With respect to the condition of economical exhaustion, it seems to be likely that
resource owners will stop extracting fossil fuels in the future because extraction costs
are too high rather than because they have already exhausted all of their available
resources. Translated to the two period setting of our model, economical exhaustion
requires that the marginal extraction costs of the last unit in the second period equals the
producer price.39 Whether or not this holds true is an empirical question and depends,
in particular, on the time horizon of the second period. As the time horizon of the
second period becomes larger, the likelihood of economical exhaustion increases. First,
as more time has passed, more fossil fuels have already been extracted, causing marginal
extraction costs to be higher. Second, the costs of fossil fuel substitutes decrease in time
which translates into lower market prices for fossil fuels in the future. In conclusion, the
assumption of economical exhaustion is likely to hold true, if the length of the second
period is sufficiently large.40
38For the market price, see Figure 10 and for supply curves, see Figure 1 in the supplementary material
of Bauer et al. (2013).
39If the producer price exceeded the marginal extraction costs, resource owners would exhaust their
entire stock and we are back in the setting of Section 4.
40If we had set up a model with infinite time horizon, the condition of economical exhaustion would have
been met with certainty because there is no fixed termination point of the game. Nevertheless, given
the existence of a substitute technology and convex extraction costs, there will be a point in time
when extraction of fossil fuels will cease. In the last period, resource owners could potentially shift
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Since all three conditions are likely to hold true, the green paradox may not arise in
response to the implementation of future carbon taxes.
6. Conclusion
We analyze the extraction behavior of fossil fuel owners in the presence of a clean sub-
stitute technology that exhibits LBD and ask under which conditions the green paradox
arises. We find that the effect of more effective learning in terms of a higher learning
factor on present emissions is ambiguous. Concerning the standard instruments to com-
bat climate change, we find that subsidizing renewable energy may provoke the green
paradox while present carbon taxes always reduce present emissions. Contrary to the
standard result of the green paradox, future carbon taxes may reduce present emissions
under certain conditions.
The effect of a higher learning factor on current emissions is ambiguous since there are
two initial effects that have ambivalent impact on current emissions. On the one hand,
a higher learning factor reduces future production costs leading to an increase in future
renewable energy output. This reduces the future energy price and induces resource
owners to shift extraction into the present. On the other hand, a higher learning factor
also triggers present renewable energy production because learning has become more
effective. This causes the present energy price to decline and incentivizes fossil fuel
owners to postpone extraction. Thus, the overall effect of learning on current extraction
is ambiguous. However, if the marginal extraction cost curve evaluated at the prevailing
energy price is sufficiently flat and the resource stock is exhausted economically rather
than physically, a higher learning factor will definitely reduce present and total emissions,
leading to less environmental harm.
the marginal extraction unit into the next period and receive the prevailing market price. However,
this would not be profitable because this would violate the arbitrage condition according to which
the last extraction unit would yield zero profits in both the last and next to last period.
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Subsidizing present renewable energy causes the green paradox if the learning factor
is sufficiently high. While the direct effect of a subsidy unambiguously reduces present
extraction, this effect is potentially outweighed by the indirect effect due to LBD. The
indirect effect causes future renewable energy supply to increase in response to higher
present renewable output, inducing fossil fuel owners to extract more rapidly. If the
marginal extraction cost curve is sufficiently flat around the prevailing energy price,
subsidizing renewable energy always reduces current and total emissions regardless of
the size of the learning factor.
A present carbon tax always reduces current emissions irrespective of the learning
factor and the steepness of the marginal extraction cost curve. Future carbon taxes
always increase current emissions when extraction costs are zero. Current emissions
also rise in response to delayed carbon taxation if the marginal extraction cost curve
is steep around the prevailing energy price. However, if the marginal extraction cost
curve is flat, future carbon taxes are likely to reduce current emissions which is in
contrast to the standard result of the green paradox. The reason is that in response to a
future carbon tax, resource owners will lower total extraction substantially and increase
present extraction only modestly. At the same time, the future energy price increases
which induces renewable energy firms to expand production in the future and, because
of the anticipation of higher future output, also today. The latter crowds out present
energy from the combustion of fossil fuels and outweighs the initial increase in present
emissions. Three conditions have to be met in order to obtain this result: The gains
from learning should be, at least partially, private, the marginal extraction cost curve
should be flat around the prevailing energy price in the future and the resource stock
should be exhausted economically rather than physically. We found some evidence that
all requirements are likely to be satisfied.
The policy implication of our paper is that a carbon tax that will be introduced only
in the future does not necessarily increase present emissions and therefore environmental
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damage. This is an important insight since environmental policies are, at least in the
short run, restricted to the effect that effective carbon taxes seem to be politically unfea-
sible for the next few years. Thus, if policy makers are restricted to employ carbon taxes
only in the future, our analysis suggests that this may not necessarily be accompanied
by unintended side effects like the green paradox.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of Propositions
The Determinants M and M’
First, we show that both determinants are negative. Applying Cramer’s rule yields
det(M) = (p′ + βP ′)(p′ − cyy − βCyy)(P ′ − CY Y ) + 2βp′P ′CyY
− βP ′2(p′ − cyy − βCyy)− (p′ + βP ′)βC2yY − p′p′(P ′ − CY Y )
which can be transformed to
det(M) = (p′+βP ′)[cyyCY Y +βCyyCY Y −βC2yY ]+p′P ′(2βCyY −cyy−βCyy−βCY Y ) < 0.
(A.1)
Since the second term is always negative and the first term is negative due to the as-
sumption that the own convexity of the cost function dominates its cross effects, the
sign of det(M) is always negative.
For the determinant of M ′ from Section 5, we proceed the same steps as above and
get
det(M ′) =(p′ + αβP ′)(cyyCY Y + βCyyCY Y − βC2yY )+
αp′P ′(2βCyY − cyy − βCyy − βCY Y ) < 0 (A.2)
which is equivalent to det(M) for α = 1. Since α ∈ [0, 1), the determinant det(M ′) is
always negative.
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Proof of Proposition 1
















βCyb[−p′P ′ + (p′ + βP ′)βCyY ] + CY b[(p′ + βP ′)(p′ − cyy − βCyy)− p′p′]
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′(CyY − CY Y )] + CY b[βP ′(βCyY − cyy − βCyy)]
]
(A.3)
which is unambiguously negative.
Proof of Proposition 2
We first report the effects of T and s on the endogenous variables x, y and Y that




















[(p′ + βP ′)CyY − p′P ′] Q 0 (A.7)
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With the exception of dyds all effects of climate policies on y and Y are ambiguous. To






















and we can conclude that present emissions decrease as long as dt > βdT = 11+rdT and
vice versa. Part b) of Proposition 2 was already shown in the main part.
Proof of Proposition 3
First, we derive equation (16). Totally differentiating equation (15) yields
P ′dX + P ′dY − dT = eX˜X˜(X˜)dX˜. (A.8)
Substituting dX = dX˜ − dx and solving for dX˜ leads to equation (16).











′(p′ − cyy − βCyy)− βp′CyY ].
Note first that dxdb
∣∣
α=0
< 0 and that the sign of dxdb
∣∣
α=1
is ambiguous. Further, dxdb depends
linearly on α. Thus, if dxdb
∣∣
α=1
was positive, there would be at most one cut-off value of





was negative, no such cut-off
39
value would exist.
















βCyb[−αp′P ′ + (p′ + αβP ′)βCyY ] + CY b[(p′ + αβP ′)(p′ − cyy − βCyy)− p′p′]
]
where the sign of both differentials is ambiguous. However, for α ≈ 0, both differentials











































′CY Y − p′CyY ] + CY b[p′(cyy + βCyy − βCyY )]
]
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
We report the effect of all climate policies on the single energy quantities x, y and Y
and on total emissions X˜. For the effect of s and t on X˜ we make use of equation (A.10).
40






























= (1− α) 1
det(M ′)
[
(p′ − cyy − βCyy)(−CY Y )− βC2yY + p′CyY
]
< 0















































(−αβ)[(p′ − cyy − βCyy)(αP ′ − CY Y )− βC2yY ]+
1
det(M ′)






(−αβ)[αβP ′CyY − p′(αP ′ − CY Y )]+
1
det(M ′)






(−αβ)[−p′CyY + αP ′(p′ − cyy − βCyy)]+
1
det(M ′)
(α− 1)[(p′ + αβP ′)(p′ − cyy − βCyy)− p′p′] Q 0












P ′ − eX˜X˜(X˜)
=
1
det(M ′)(P ′ − eX˜X˜(X˜))
[




det(M ′)(P ′ − eX˜X˜(X˜))
[


















As can be seen dxdT
∣∣
α=0
< 0 while dxdT
∣∣
α=1







P ′)(p′− cyy − βCyy) + βC2yY − p′CyY
]
> 0 which guarantees the existence of exactly one
cut-off value for α ∈ (0, 1) where dxdT < (>)0 if α is below (above) this value.
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A.2. Functional Form and Parameter Values for Figure 3
For Figure 3 in the main part, we used the following functional forms and parameters:
Table 3: Functional Forms
Function Functional Form
c(y) c(y) = dy + c/2y2





p(x+ y) p(x+ y) = a(x+ y)(−η)
P (X¯ − x+ y) P (X¯ − x+ y) = a(X¯ − x+ y)(−η)
Table 4: Parameter Values
Parameter c d A a X¯ η β
Value 0.1 0.5 40 10 20 1 0.5
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